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Legislative administrative action and the 
limited extent of public participation
RADLEY HENRICO*
1  Introduction
The preamble of our constitution acknowledges that government is based on the 
will of the people. Section 1(d) of the constitution states that the Republic of South 
Africa is one sovereign, democratic state founded on the value of universal adult 
suffrage, a national common voters’ roll, regular elections and a multi-party system 
of democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness. 
Whilst the constitution recognises a representative, participatory and direct 
democracy, the focus of this paper is on the participatory dimension of democracy 
as it relates to legislative administrative actions. Participatory democracy is given 
due recognition in our constitution through public involvement in parliament’s 
law-making process. Parliament is obliged to take adequate steps to ensure public 
involvement as a pre-condition to the enactment of its laws. This requirement is 
necessary if we are to maintain (and sustain) the democratic ethos underpinning our 
constitution. The legislative capacity of parliament has been extended by permitting 
the executive to make laws in accordance with statutory provisions or powers 
entrusted to them either in terms of specific acts or the constitution. Laws enacted 
by members of the executive (subordinate or delegated legislation) are referred to as 
executive rule-making or legislative administrative action. Such actions, emanating 
from the executive arm of government, take the form of regulations, proclamations 
and ministerial rules or notices. Subordinate legislation is not only the most 
recognisable form of administrative action; it is also the mainstay of the modern 
bureaucratic state. Legislative administrative action may not be in conflict with 
the constitution. Neither may it be inconsistent with the empowering or enabling 
primary legislation. Whilst having no less force than primary legislation – assuming 
there is no unavoidable conflict arising between original and delegated legislation 
in pari materiae – the question which arises in respect of legislative administrative 
action is the extent to which the tabling thereof depends on public participation. 
This article will focus first on the nature of public involvement as it pertains 
to the legislature. The purpose of this is to understand the importance of public 
participation in the legislative process. It will be argued that public participation in 
the law-making process of parliament is necessary because of certain peremptory 
provisions in the constitution. More significantly, the need for public participation, 
it will be argued, is premised on the underlying constitutional imperatives of 
accountability, transparency and transformation. Second, the paper will look at 
the limited extent of public participation in respect of legislative administrative 
actions. Reasons for the limitation of public participation will be considered in the 
context of having regard to the nature of legislative administrative action. Whilst 
there can be no question about the extent of public participation in the tabling of 
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primary legislation, it is significant to take account of the (limited) extent of public 
participation when it comes to the tabling of legislative administrative action. The 
paper finishes with some concluding observations. 
2  The legislative process and public involvement
Public involvement in the enactment of legislation in the national and provincial 
legislative spheres of government is expressly recognised under the constitution. 
Section 59(1)(a) of the constitution provides that “[t]he National Assembly must 
facilitate public involvement in the legislative and other processes of the Assembly 
and its committees”. Section 72(1)(a) states that “[t]he National Council of Provinces 
must facilitate public involvement in the legislative and other processes of the 
Council and its committees”. Employment of the peremptory verb “must” makes it 
obligatory for the national assembly and national council of provinces to facilitate 
public involvement. The aforesaid provisions are buttressed by section 118(1)(a), 
which states that “[a] provincial legislature must facilitate public involvement in the 
legislative and other processes of the legislature and its committees”. This express 
articulation of duties and obligations – on the part of the national assembly and 
the national council of provinces – stems from the fact that section 42(1) of the 
constitution acknowledges parliament as consisting of the national assembly and 
national council of provinces. In terms of section 43(a)-(c) the legislative authority 
of the Republic is vested in the national, provincial and local spheres of government. 
The duty to facilitate public involvement imposed on the national assembly and the 
national council of provinces is also extended to local government or a municipality 
passing a by-law under section 156(2) of the constitution. In terms of section 160(4)(b) 
“no by-law may be passed by a municipal council unless the proposed by-law has 
been published for public comment”.1 One of the objects of local government under 
section 152(1)(e) is “to encourage the involvement of communities and community 
organisations in the matters of local government”. Section 12(3)(b) of the Local 
Government: Municipal Systems Act2 echoes the above-mentioned provision of 
section 160(4)(b) in providing that “no by-law may be passed by a municipal council 
unless the proposed by-law has been published for public comment that allows the 
public an opportunity to make representations” in relation thereto. 
In Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly3 the 
constitutional court had to decide a matter in which the applicant challenged the 
constitutional validity of certain health bills passed by the national council of 
provinces without inviting written submissions, or conducting public hearings in 
order to facilitate public involvement in the legislative process.4 Ngcobo J, in a 
unanimous decision, held that the importance of allowing public participation in 
the legislative process, as recognised in our constitution, echoes the imperatives 
contained in articles 25(a) and (b) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights that envisage participatory engagement (by members of the public) 
in the conduct of government affairs, such as law-making.5 Moreover, the notion 
of allowing public participation in the affairs of state is not novel in South African 
constitutionalism given “the traditional means of public participation [in the form 
1 See also Kouga Municipality v Bellingham 2012 2 All SA 391 (SCA). 
2 32 of 2000. 
3 2006 6 SA 416 (CC). 
4 par 2.
5 par 98-100. 
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of] imbizo/lekgotla/bosberaad”.6 Referring to the preamble of the constitution, the 
court per Ngcobo J held:
“Commitment to principles of accountability, responsiveness and openness shows that our 
constitutional democracy is not only representative but also contains participatory elements. This 
is a defining feature of the democracy that is contemplated. It is apparent from the Preamble of the 
Constitution that one of the basic objectives of our constitutional enterprise is the establishment 
of a democratic and open government in which the people shall participate to some degree in the 
law-making process.”7 
The importance of public participation in the law-making process is highlighted by 
the following observation:
“The duty to facilitate public participation in the law-making process would be meaningless unless 
it sought to ensure that the public participates in that process. The very purpose in facilitating public 
participation in legislative and other processes is to ensure that the public participates in the law-
making process consistent with our democracy. Indeed, it is apparent from the powers and duties of 
the legislative organs of State that the Constitution contemplates that the public will participate in 
the law-making process.”8 
And:
“Public participation in the law-making process is one of the means of ensuring that legislation is 
both informed and responsive. If legislation is infused with a degree of openness and participation, 
this will minimise dangers of arbitrariness and irrationality in the formulation of legislation. The 
objective of involving the public in the law-making process is to ensure that the legislators are 
aware of the concerns of the public. And if legislators are aware of these concerns, this will promote 
legitimacy, and thus the acceptance, of the legislation. This not only improves the quality of the 
law-making process, but it also serves as an important principle that government should be open, 
accessible, accountable and responsive. And this enhances our democracy.”9 
It cannot be gainsaid that public participation in the law-making process of the 
three spheres of government gives impetus to our constitutional construct.10 The 
value thereof is premised on the following precepts. First, it recognises the value 
which the South African citizenry can add to the content of legislation in their 
capacity as interested stakeholders. Put differently, the more input we have from 
diverse interested persons or bodies regarding legislation, the greater the potential 
substantive intrinsic worth and value of the outcome. Second, it acts as a measure 
of holding government accountable and responsive to the needs of the public. Third, 
it gives effect to the constitutional enshrined freedom of expression11 and political 
rights.12 Fourth, public participation in the legislative process can and should also be 
seen as a means of mitigating and reducing potential challenges to the substance of 
legislation on grounds that it impugns rights under section 33(1) of the constitution 
6 par 101. 
7 par 111 – emphasis added. 
8 par 135. 
9 par 205. See also the judgment by Yacoob J par 274. 
10 The value of public participation in the legislative process was also confirmed by the constitutional 
court in South African Veterinary Association v Speaker of the National Assembly 2019 3 SA 62 (CC) 
par 18-23; Matatiele Municipality v President of the RSA (2) 2007 6 SA 477 (CC), 2007 1 BCLR 
47 (CC); Ramakatse v Magashule 2013 2 BCLR 202 (CC) and Oriani-Ambrosini v Speaker of the 
National Assembly 2013 1 BCLR 14 (CC). 
11 s 16(1). 
12 s 19(1).
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or a declaration of invalidity in terms of section 172(1)(a) of the constitution.13 Fifth, 
the relationship between the legislature and the public is essentially based on a 
power imbalance where the legislative arm of government and the power capable 
of being exercised is in a superior authoritative position.14 Public participation at 
best tempers the legislative authority. In its broadest sense, public participation 
offers democratic legitimacy to the legislative power of parliament.15 It is a means 
by which the people have the ability to influence policy decisions and the ultimate 
implementation of primary legislation. Having discussed the basis on which public 
participation is mandatory and lends credence to our democracy it is noteworthy to 
contrast this with the limited extent of public participation in respect of legislative 
administrative action. 
3  Contextualising public participation in relation to legislative administrative 
action
Our modern state functions and operates with reference to legislative regimes 
consisting of primary and secondary (subordinate, delegated or derived) legislation. 
Parliament’s legislative capacity – and ability to effectively govern – is assisted by 
allowing members of the executive to make subordinate legislation.16 This form 
of legislation is the most easily recognised form of administrative action.17 As 
previously mentioned, it consists of ministerial rules and notices, proclamations 
and regulations (laws). In this sense they constitute legislative actions or acts of 
the administration, as opposed to the legislature. The aforementioned laws are 
referred to as legislative administrative action. This is distinguishable from general 
administrative functions which refer to decisions by administrators or other bodies18 
who exercise public powers. 
The term “legislature” refers to bodies which have deliberate legislative 
competencies, such as parliament, the national council of provinces (NCOP) and 
municipal councils.19 The executive authority of the republic is vested in the president 
together with members of the cabinet.20 The executive branch of government 
implements and gives effect to the will of the legislature. Both arms of government 
13 This is not to mean, however, that public participation in the legislative process per se serves to waive 
any rights an applicant may have under either s 33(1) or 172(1)(a) of the constitution.
14 Burns and Henrico Administrative Law (2020) 6, 7 and 24. 
15 Rakar “Public participation and democratic legitimacy of rulemaking – a comparative analysis” 2017 
Law and Economics Review 57 59; Bekker Citizen Participation in Local Government (1996) 221; 
Girma “Effective public involvement in the oversight processes of parliaments and provincial or 
regional legislatures” 2014 Journal of the South African Legislative Sector 21 22; Bishop “Vampire 
or prince? The listening constitution and Merafong Demarcation Forum v President of the RSA” 2009 
Constitutional Law Review 313 321-326. 
16 In terms of s 239(a) of the constitution, national legislation includes subordinate legislation made in 
terms of an act of parliament. 
17 Burns and Henrico (n 14) 90.
18 natural or juristic. 
19 In this regard see s 43(a)-(c) of the constitution which vests the legislative authority of the Republic 
in the three spheres of government. Also see Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg 
Transitional Metropolitan Council 1999 1 SA 374 (CC) par 41-42.
20 s 83 and 85 of the constitution. 
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and all organs of state,21 including the judiciary, are bound by the bill of rights.22 
Notionally, when we speak of the executive arm of government, we refer essentially 
to the administration of government. As noted in President of the Republic of 
South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union,23 it is in the implementation 
of legislation (by the administration) that the public service performs its duties in 
executing the “lawful policies of the government of the day”.24 Currie and De Waal 
correctly contend that with reference to the definition of organ of state in section 239 
and members who comprise the executive, it is difficult to conceive of conduct of the 
executive that would not also amount to conduct of an organ of state.25 
The delegation of law-making powers by the legislature to members of the 
executive or administrators is an essential feature of a modern functional state.26 
In Bezuidenhout v Road Accident Fund,27 Vivier JA observed that a legislature 
delegates law-making power because it cannot directly exert its will in every detail. 
All it can do in practice is lay down the outline.28 Hoexter29 also aptly refers to 
Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature v President of the Republic of South 
Africa30 in which Chaskalson P stated:
“In a modern State detailed provisions are often required for the purpose of implementing and 
regulating laws and Parliament cannot be expected to deal with all such matters itself. There is 
nothing in the Constitution which prohibits Parliament from delegating subordinate regulatory 
authority to other bodies. The power to do so is necessary for effective law-making. It is implicit in 
the power to make laws for the country and I have no doubt that under our Constitution Parliament 
can pass legislation delegating such legislative functions to other bodies.”31 
The term “subordinate” or “delegated” legislation is not defined in the constitution. 
However, section 101(3) provides that “proclamations, regulations and other 
instruments of subordinate legislation must be accessible to the public”. Whilst 
ministers are responsible for the powers and functions assigned to them by the 
state president32 the constitution does not prescribe how regulations are to be made 
or enacted.33 In Minister of Health NO v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd,34 as 
21 An organ of state in terms of s 239(a) and (b) of the constitution is defined as any department of state 
or administration in the national, provincial or local sphere of government; or any other functionary 
or institution exercising a power or performing a function in terms of the constitution or a provincial 
constitution; or exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation, 
but does not include a court or judicial officer. 
22 s 8(1) of the constitution.
23 2000 1 SA 1 (CC).
24 See President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union (n 23) par 138 
as read with s 197(1) of the constitution: “Within public administration there is a public service for 
the Republic, which must function, and be structured, in terms of national legislation, and which must 
loyally execute the lawful policies of the government of the day.” 
25 Currie and De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2012) 43. 
26 Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2012) 52; and AAA Investments (Pty) Ltd v Micro Finance 
Regulatory Council 2007 1 SA 343 (CC) 122.
27 2003 6 SA 61 (SCA). 
28 par 10 with reference to Hoexter (n 26) 26.
29 Hoexter (n 26) 26.
30 1995 4 SA 877 (CC).
31 par 51.
32 in terms of s 92(1) of the constitution. In the case of provinces, members of the executive council are 
responsible for the functions of the executive assigned to them by the premier in terms of s 133(1) of 
the constitution. 
33 See Minister of Home Affairs v Liebenberg 2002 1 SA 33 (CC) par 13 and Mulowayi v Minister of 
Home Affairs 2019 4 BCLR 496 (CC) par 28.
34 2006 2 SA 311 (CC).
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to whether ministerial regulations (subordinate legislation) could be classified as 
administrative action, Chaskalson CJ found that to hold that subordinate (delegated) 
legislation does not form part of the right to just administrative action would be 
contrary the constitutional compact giving effect to an open and transparent govern-
ment.35 Moreover, Chaskalson CJ expressly found that subordinate legislation forms 
an essential part of the public administration giving effect to legislative policy and 
providing details for the execution of such policies.36 The general interest of the public 
in gaining access thereto gives effect to the principle of accountability, transparency 
and openness, which is axiomatic to our democratic ethos underpinned by a culture 
of justification. Accessibility also translates into awareness on the part of the public 
of what the law is. As such it is understandable for laws of a deliberate legislative 
body and executive decisions37 to be published in the Government Gazette.38 
Authority to make delegated legislation arises by virtue of primary legislation 
which vests in a member of the executive or an administrator the power to make rules, 
proclamations or most typically, regulations giving effect to a specific act or acts.39 
Whilst section 16 of the Interpretation Act40 prescribes that certain enactments,41 
namely law-making on the part of the executive (legislative administrative actions), 
shall be published in the Government Gazette, no directive is given regarding public 
comment or participation in respect thereof. Neither does any provision exist in 
the constitution making allowance for public comment or participation. Whilst the 
participatory element on the part of the public is sufficiently catered for in respect 
of the passing of deliberate legislation – as discussed in paragraph 1 of section 3 
above – the same typical participation in respect of legislative administrative action 
is not provided for. 
There can be no quibble with the fact that publication, as a peremptory requirement, 
in respect of both primary and subordinate legislation facilitates communication of 
the content of such laws to the general public. However, the extensive allowance 
made for public participation in relation to primary legislation may well support the 
presumption that in general there is greater public awareness of primary legislation 
than of legislative administrative actions. An immediate concern that arises is the 
fact that legislative administrative actions – which provide the detail and specificity 
lacking in the normative provisions of principle legislation – have limited public 
participation. In the pre-constitutional dispensation members of the public were for 
35 par 113. 
36 par 113. Chaskalson CJ, Langa DCJ, Ngcobo J, O’Regan J and Van der Westhuizen J found that the 
making of regulations constituted administrative action under Act 3 of 2000. Five justices found it was 
not necessary to decide the issue. Sachs J was of the view that all regulation-making was governed not 
by Act 3 of 2000 but by the principle of legality. Chaskalson CJ reasoned that all regulation-making 
constituted administrative action under Act 3 of 2000 (par 109). The supreme court of appeal in City 
of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Cable City (Pty) Ltd 2010 3 SA 589 (SCA), relying on the 
reasoning of Chaskalson CJ in the New Clicks case, confirmed the appellant’s submission that the 
making of regulations by a minister constitutes administrative action in terms of Act 3 of 2000 (per par 
10-11). 
37 which can also be referred to as legislative administrative action. 
38 See the provisions of s 81, 123 and 162 of the constitution pertaining to the publication of national, 
provincial and municipal laws as read with s 13, 16 and 16A of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957. 
39 the New Clicks case (n 34) par 211.
40 33 of 1957.
41 The section refers to a “by-law, regulation, rule or order” made by a member of the executive. It 
must be noted that the reference to by-law under the pre-constitutional dispensation is different to 
our current understanding of a by-law. In terms of s 43(c), as read with s 156(2) of the constitution, a 
municipality has deliberate legislative authority to make by-laws in relation to matters listed in part B 
of schedule 5 of the constitution. 
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the most part kept in the proverbial dark about proposed legislative administrative 
actions. Once enacted, the only way of challenging such actions were by way of 
very limited grounds of judicial review.42 For purposes of this paper, the crucial 
question pertaining to legislative administrative actions is the limited extent of 
public participation. Can one assume that as a matter of administrative efficacy, 
delegated legislation made pursuant to authority granted to an administrator in terms 
of original legislation requires the administrator to exercise his or her discretion 
consistent with the constitution and original legislation? Since public participation 
has been catered for with respect to original legislation, is further and additional 
public participation in respect of delegated legislation unwarranted? Surely the 
answer falls to be rejected on the basis, as previously mentioned, that parliament’s 
legislative capacity is extended by granting law-making powers to administrators? 
In addition, the definition of national and provincial legislation includes subordinate 
legislation. By inference, the necessity of public participation in relation to primary 
legislation is equally applicable in relation to legislative administrative actions. 
Regard should be had to the extent to which such laws serve to function as the 
regulatory edifice of our modern society. As such, the need for public participation 
in relation to subordinate legislation should depend on the nature of the subordinate 
legislation in question. The nature of certain regulations may have far-reaching 
consequences for the public at large compared to, for example, mere guidelines or 
directives. In AAA Investments (Pty) Ltd v Micro Finance Regulatory Council,43 
the minister of finance consulted interested role players regarding the optimal way 
in which the micro-lending industry could be regulated resulting in the minister 
issuing an Exemption Notice.44 The importance and gravitas of the subject matter 
in question, namely how to effectively regulate the micro-lending industry, gave 
impetus to the need for public participation. The latter was not required in terms 
of the original legislation under which the minister had authority to issue the 
relevant regulations. The minister, in the exercise of his discretion, engaged public 
stakeholders. 
An administrator exercises public power or performs a public function in terms 
of legislation.45 Essentially it is state power which seeks to regulate the public or a 
particular aspect of public affairs. In Mittalsteel South Africa Ltd v Hlatshwayo46 
it was held that the exercise of public power amounts to the ability to regulate 
and control conduct on the part of others.47 Moreover, in Logbro Properties CC 
v Bedderson NO48 the exercise of public power was said to amount to someone 
acting from a position of superiority or authority by virtue of it being a public 
authority.49 The exercise of state power – on the part of administrators in enacting 
delegated legislation – speaks directly to the imbalance of power between the 
state and citizenry. A way of addressing this imbalance is the facilitation of public 
participation in respect of delegated legislation. Participation in a way that allows 
42 For reading on judicial review in the pre-constitutional dispensation, see Burns and Henrico (n 14) 
23-24; and Hoexter (n 26) 13-15. 
43 (n 26).
44 par 11-12. 
45 as read in terms of the definition of organ of state under s 239 of the constitution. 
46 2007 1 SA 66 (SCA).
47 par 12.
48 2003 2 SA 460 (SCA).
49 par 10. Also see Cape Metropolitan Council v Metro Inspection Services (Western Cape) CC 2001 3 
SA 1013 (SCA) and Directory Advertising Cost Cutters v Minister of Posts, Telecommunications and 
Broadcasting 1996 3 SA 800 (T).
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for interested stakeholders to comment on proposed delegated legislation lends 
credence and cogency to the democratic status of such delegated legislation. 
Due account must be had of the fact that any person aggrieved by administrative 
acts which are allegedly unlawful, unreasonable or procedurally unfair has recourse 
to just administrative action under section 33 of the constitution. The latter is 
animated by the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act,50 which should be used 
as the default route to judicial review applications.51 Alternatively, even where the 
exercise of power does not constitute administrative action reviewable under Act 
3 of 2000 it can still be reviewed in terms of the principle of legality.52 The right 
to judicially review all exercise of public power is demonstrative of the culture of 
justification in terms of which the exercise of all power needs to be accountable. 
The right an individual would have to judicially review administrative action is an 
individual right pertaining to purely administrative functions. In other words, it 
relates to the review of decisions by administrators or other bodies exercising public 
power. This right may be described as a so-called “reactive” right, since it seeks to 
challenge and set aside or vary a decision already taken. Rights which members of 
the public have under section 4 to challenge legislative administrative action are 
discussed in more detail below. 
The constitutional right of judicial review, whether to challenge a purely 
admin istrative decision53 or legislative administrative action54 because of its 
“reactive” nature, is something which arises or takes place ex post facto. A 
constitutional guarantee of judicial review is one of the functional aspects of a 
democracy. However, such guarantee must be juxtaposed with the benefits to 
be gained from public participation in the deliberative legislative process and 
legislative administrative action which are essentially “proactive” democratic 
rights. Hutchinson is sceptical of judicial review. This is due to the limit to which 
the court can intervene on account of the separation of powers doctrine and also 
due to the practical inability of the population in general to engage judicial review 
as an effective remedy.55 With reference to judicial review, as opposed to public 
participation or involvement in the democratic process, Hutchinson comments 
that:
“Judicial review operates as a pale and perverse substitute for genuine and vigorous popular 
involvement and control. Indeed, the need for judicial review is premised on the failure of 
the institutional structure of British democracy to ensure meaningful citizen participation in 
government.”56 
50 3 of 2000. 
51 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) par 25; Mazibuko 
v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC) par 73; Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau 
2014 5 SA 69 (CC) par 69; the New Clicks case (n 34) par 94-96 and 437 and Buffalo City Metropolitan 
Municipality v Asla Construction (Pty) Ltd 2019 4 SA 331 (CC) par 112.
52 Hoexter “The principle of legality in South African administrative law” 2004 Macquarie Law Journal 
165 168 ff. 
53 in terms of s 1 of Act 3 of 2000. 
54 in terms of s 4 of Act 3 of 2000. 
55 Hutchinson “Mice under a chair: democracy, courts and the administrative state” 1990 University of 
Toronto Law Journal 374 376 and 403. 
56 Hutchinson “The rise and ruse of administrative law and scholarship” 1985 Modern Law Review 323. 
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Access to courts57 and express recognition of the enforcement of rights58 serve to 
bolster just administrative action rights.59 However, practically – and realistically – 
the ability to bring a judicial review application is often outside the reach of many 
citizens adversely affected by administrative decisions. Put differently, their ability 
to enforce any rights they may have in terms of a judicial review application is 
informed (and determined) by their financial wherewithal. On the other hand, the 
ability of a citizen to participate and deliberate in respect of executive decision-
making is not dependent on financial resources; it merely depends on the extent 
to which the public is made aware of potential delegated legislation and given an 
opportunity to comment thereon prior to its finalisation.60 Moreover, O’Regan J 
contends that instead of reliance being placed on judicial review, administrative law 
needs to focus on making correct decisions. This is aided by inter alia involving 
interest group representation in the decision-making process and facilitating notice-
and-comment procedures on the part of the public.61
The International Association for Public Participation, of which South Africa is a 
member, has established certain core values for the practice of public participation.62 
These values are premised on the fact that public participation:
• is based on the belief that those who are affected by a decision have a right to be 
involved in the decision-making process;
• includes the promise that the public’s contribution will influence the decision;
• promotes sustainable decisions by recognising and communicating the needs 
and interests of all participants, including decision makers;
• seeks input from participants in designing how they participate; and
• communicates to participants how their input affected the decision. 
The aforesaid values are all demonstrative of active public involvement, alternatively 
the opportunity given to the public to become involved in the decision-making 
process. Moreover, they facilitate meaningful engagement between the public and 
those in authority duly authorised to make laws which can potentially affect the 
public in general and individuals in particular.63 Such engagement enables – and 
recognises – the value of dialogue and the ability of the public to materially influence 
and impact upon policy before it is implemented in the form of a binding decision. 
Creighton considers it imperative that an obligation of public participation is that 
the public must be kept informed and made aware of decisions that could possibly 
affect them. This is important so that they can decide whether or not they wish 
57 in terms of s 34 of the constitution. 
58 in terms of s 38 of the constitution. 
59 in terms of s 33 of the constitution. 
60 For further reading on the importance of civic participation and deliberation in the administrative 
processes of government, see Eskridge and Peller “The new public law movement: moderation as 
a postmodern cultural form” 1991 Michigan Law Review 707 710; Seidenfeld “A civic republican 
justification for the bureaucratic state” 1992 Harvard Law Review 1512 1514; Czapanskiy and Manjoo 
“The right of public participation in the law-making process and the role of the legislature in the 
promotion of this right” 2008 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 14 16; Rakar (n 
15) 60 and Ntsikelelo, Mekoa and Nondumiso “Participatory democracy in theory and practice: a case 
study of local government in South Africa” 2014 Africa’s Public Service Delivery and Performance 
Review 31 32. 
61 O’Regan “Rules for rule-making: administrative law and subordinate legislation” 1993 Acta Juridica 
168 170 ff.
62 https://www.iap2.org/page/corevalues (03-09-2019).
63 Calland The First Five Years  A Review of South Africa’s Democratic Parliament (1999) 62.
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to become involved in the public participation process.64 It has also been asserted 
that public participation strengthens institutions of representative democracy by 
democratising such institutions.65 Masango emphasises that public participation 
constitutes an essential ingredient of good governance in any democracy.66 Put 
differently, a democracy is the poorer for lack of adequate and sufficient public 
participation. This raises the inevitable question of what constitutes adequate and 
sufficient public participation. There can be no universal principle set down in this 
regard. Given the rapid ever-expanding and ongoing decision-making process of 
legislative administrative action it would be unreasonable and unrealistic to expect 
and anticipate public participation in respect of each and every particular regulation 
or ministerial notice. The ability of the modern state to effectively govern would 
simply grind to a halt were public participation be required in respect of every 
legislative administrative action. 
It should be accepted that for public participation to hold any weight, it must be 
meaningful, failing which it is de facto nugatory and effectively valueless. In this 
regard, Arenstein has pointed out that whether public participation is meaningful 
depends on the extent to which it can be argued that such participation affects the 
outcome of the process or the result.67 A justifiable concern arising from public 
participation is the extent to which such participation may favour the exclusive 
interests of a select citizenry, such as business, who are able to organise themselves 
as opposed to citizens in general who may be socio-economically disadvantaged 
and unable to mobilise themselves. This is aptly described by Hoexter68 who refers 
to the following observation by Atkinson:
“… public participation in administrative decision-making, planning and implementation is 
inherently particularistic. At best, it opens the way for enthusiastic, motivated, skilled and confident 
interests to build co-operative relations with specific administrative departments. At worst, it can 
degenerate into exclusivist, clientelist or corporatist forms of special treatment. The problem of 
involving the unorganised, the demoralized, the unfashionable and underprivileged tends to remain 
intractable.”69  
The only means of addressing this potentially intractable problem is in terms of 
section 4 of Act 3 of 2000. Where administrative action materially and adversely 
affects the rights of the public, a notice-and-comment procedure and public 
inquiry must be held by the administrator70 in order to give effect to the right to 
procedurally fair administrative action.71 A decision, or a failure to take a decision, 
by an administrator in terms of section 4(1) of Act 3 of 2000 is excluded from the 
definition of administrative action under section 1 of Act 3 of 2000. Whilst this may 
64 Creighton The Public Participation Handbook (2005) 23.
65 Calland (n 63) 62; and Kotze (ed) Development Administration and Management  A Holistic Approach 
(1997) 37; Davids Voices from Below  Reflecting on Ten Years of Public Participation  The Case of 
Local Government in the Western Cape (2005) 29; Masango “Public participation: a critical ingredient 
of good governance” 2002 Politeia 52 53 and De Vos (ed) South African Constitutional Law in Context 
(2015) 93-95. 
66 Masango (n 65) 63. Also see De Vos (n 65) 119-122. 
67 Arenstein “A ladder of citizen participation” 1969 Journal of the American Institute of Planners 219 
220.
68 Hoexter (n 26) 83. 
69 Atkinson Techniques of Public Participation in Local Government (1997) 12. 
70 in terms of s 4(1) and 4(2) of Act 3 of 2000. 
71 This is not to be confused with the substantive right to procedurally fair administrative action as 
provided for in terms of s 3 of Act 3 of 2000. 
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very well exclude the possibility of judicial review in terms of Act 3 of 2000, it does 
not preclude judicial review in terms of the principle of legality.72 
Prior to the coming into operation of section 4 of Act 3 of 2000,73 there was 
no general duty on administrative officials to engage members of the public in 
any process, save for instances where specific legislation would impose such a 
duty.74 If the administrative official decides to hold a public inquiry such process 
is governed by subsection 4(2). The decision to follow a notice-and-comment 
procedure is in turn governed by subsection 4(3). An administrator may depart from 
the requirements referred to in subsections (1)(a), (2) and (3) if it is reasonable and 
justifiable.75 “Public” is defined in section 1 of Act 3 of 2000 to mean any group 
or class of the public.76 Since section 3 of Act 3 of 2000 provides for procedurally 
fair administrative action affecting any person, some debate has arisen as to the 
relevance of section 4.77 However, as Hoexter points out, section 4 permits public 
involvement in respect of administrative action which materially and adversely 
affects the rights of the public78 or the interests of the public.79 To the extent that it 
encourages – and enables – public participation, it increases democratic legitimacy 
and administrative justice.80 
Support for the viability of section 4 as a means by which the public can generally 
participate in legislative administrative action affecting the public is reflected in our 
case law. In Minister of Home Affairs v Eisenberg and Associates81 immigration 
regulations were attacked and challenged on the grounds that the minister of home 
affairs failed to comply with the notice-and-comment procedures of the relevant 
enabling legislation. With reference to section 4 of Act 3 of 2000, Chaskalson CJ 
stated:
“In each case it is a question of construction whether a statute making provision for administrative 
action requires special procedures to be followed before the action is taken. In addition, whether or 
not such provisions are made, the administrative action must ordinarily be carried out consistently 
with PAJA.”82 
72 Hoexter (n 26) 85 and 410. 
73 on 31 July 2002. 
74 Hoexter (n 26) 84-85 who refers to s 32 of the Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989. Also Burns 
and Henrico (n 14) 320-324. 
75 In terms of subs 4(4)(a), as read with subpar 4(4)(b)(i)-(v), the latter providing that a departure from 
a notice-and-comment procedure or public inquiry procedure is reasonable and justifiable considering 
factors such as: (i) the objects of the empowering provision; (ii) the nature and purpose of, and the need 
to take, the administrative action; (iii) the likely effect of the administrative action; (iv) the urgency of 
taking the administrative action or the urgency of the matter; and (v) the need to promote an efficient 
administration and good governance. 
76 Burns and Henrico (n 14) 323-324 give some examples of what constitutes the “public” with reference 
to the effect that certain legislative provisions have on the general public, as opposed to a particular 
individual, namely s 3(4)(i) of the National Education Policy Act 27 of 1996 and the Marine Living 
Resources Act 18 of 1998. 
77 See Hoexter (n 26) 408-409; Burns and Henrico (n 14) 320-322; Raubenheimer “Section 4 of PAJA: 
the constitutional standard for participative provisions in land use management” 2007 SA Public Law 
491 495 and Govender “An assessment of section 4 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 
2000 as a means of advancing participatory democracy in South Africa” 2003 SA Public Law 404 
406-410. 
78 Hoexter (n 26) 409.
79 De Ville Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa (2005) 227.
80 Hoexter (n 26) 407-408. 
81 2003 5 SA 281 (CC). 
82 par 59. See Hoexter (n 26) 409. 
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In Minister of Health NO v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd,83 Chaskalson CJ 
correctly pointed out how administrative fairness standards required one to 
distinguish between legislative administrative action as opposed to administrative 
adjudication. The latter pertained to individual decisions, such as the refusal to 
grant a licence, whereas the former pertained to rule-making in which “diverse and 
often conflicting interests have to be taken into account” and the “decision relates to 
a question of policy”.84 The regulations that were the object of judicial review in the 
New Clicks case were found to have met the requirements of section 4 of Act 3 of 
2000 on account of the fact that the administrators had engaged in extensive public 
participation procedures before issuing the relevant medicine pricing regulations.85
In Earthlife Africa (Cape Town) v Director-General: Department of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism86 the full bench of the court found that the decision of the 
director general to allow the construction of a pebble-bed nuclear reactor had to 
comply with sections 3 and 4 of Act 3 of 2000 due to the fact that it affected the 
rights of individuals and the public in general.87 
In Combrink v Minister of Correctional Services88 the court found the imple-
mentation of a departmental guideline – which was in the form of a circular letter 
– pertaining to parole to be subject to the right to just administrative action in terms 
of section 4 of Act 3 of 2000. 
Section 4 of Act 3 of 2000 can thus be described as a mechanism by which 
members of the public may resort to employing for purposes of ensuring there is 
public participation in respect of subordinate legislation. Conceivably there will be 
instances where due to the substantial socio-economic divisions in our society many 
persons who stand to be affected by such action will either not have the financial 
means of enforcing such rights or simply be unaware thereof. This is the reality 
of the situation as referred to by Atkinson. However, the presence of section 4 – 
and the right afforded members of the public – to be involved in and participate in 
legislative administrative action must be recognised for the value it contributes to our 
democratic processes. This is in stark contrast to our pre-democratic position where 
members of the public were essentially none the wiser about matters concerning 
them until such time that subordinate legislation was enacted. 
The words “materially and adversely affected” as they appear in subsection 4(1) 
will “activate” the provisions of section 4 and impose on the administrator the 
obligations as set out in subsections 2 and 3. However, there is no duty which is 
imposed on an administrator in respect of every single legislative administrative 
action taken. Such duty it would seem can only arise on a case-by-case basis and 
in particular where the administrative action in question materially and adversely 
affects the rights of the public.89 As noted by Chaskalson CJ in the Eisenberg case, 
each case must be decided with reference to the particular primary legislation which 
provides for administrative action whether a special procedure must be followed. 
Moreover, whether or not special procedures are provided for the administrative 
action must be consistent with Act 3 of 2000. This is, however, understandable for 
83 n 34. 
84 par 153 and 154. See Hoexter (n 26) 410. 
85 par 182 and 484. See Hoexter (n 26) 410.
86 2005 3 SA 156 (C).
87 par 48. See Hoexter (n 26) 411. 
88 2001 3 SA 338 (D). See Burns and Henrico (n 14) 320 n 22. 
89 Burns and Henrico (n 14) 324-325. 
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the effective running of the state administration and in particular so as to preclude 
section 4 from being applicable to trivial matters.90 
4  Conclusion
The extent of public participation in respect of legislation is guaranteed by various 
provisions of the constitution. In this way our constitution can be described as giving 
effect to the participatory dimension of democracy. Public participation in the 
legislative process ensures that the greatest number of views are taken into account 
and considered in the policy-formulating phase before such policy is implemented 
in the form of legislation. The enactment of subordinate legislation, however, is not 
necessarily conditional on the responsible member of the executive having solicited 
and engaged public participation. Whether or not public participation is required 
in respect of particular subordinate legislation will be informed by the content of 
the empowering provision of the legislation. Alternatively, it can be determined 
by the importance of engaging public participation in the formulation of particular 
subordinate legislation. This will all be determined on a casuistic basis. The limited 
extent, or lack of public participation apropos subordinate legislation is safeguarded 
by the provisions of section 4 of Act 3 of 2000 which can be invoked on grounds 
that particular administrative action materially and adversely affects the rights of 
the public. Some may argue that section 4 does not serve as an appropriate substitute 
for addressing concerns that public participation is not a precursor to the enactment 
of subordinate legislation. However, when one considers the practical efficacy 
with which the affairs of modern government must be administered it must be 
acknowledged that administrators who are tasked with exercising public powers 
(in the form of enacting subordinate legislation) do so subject to the supremacy 
of the constitution and the principle of legality. In this sense it is conceivable and 
understandable that public participation, unlike the case with deliberate legislation, 
will not be required in each and every instance when subordinate legislation is 
enacted. 
SAMEVATTING
WETGEWENDE ADMINISTRATIEWE OPTREDE EN DIE BEPERKTE 
OMVANG VAN PUBLIEKE DEELNAME 
Die Suid-Afrikaanse grondwet bevat talle uitdruklike bepalings ingevolge waarvan die nasionale, 
provinsiale en plaaslike wetgewer moet verseker dat daar openbare deelname in die wetgewende proses 
is. Die motivering vir sodanige deelname in die wetgewende proses is om uitvoering te gee aan die 
burgerlike en politieke regte van die publiek. Dit veronderstel dat slegs ingeligte menings ondersteun 
deur die lede van die publiek neerslag in wetgewing behoort te vind. Nakoming van die voorskrif 
van openbare deelname verleen stukrag aan die erkenning van ’n veelsydigheid van standpunte wat 
uiteindelik ’n positiewe neerslag behoort te vind in die formulering van beleid en die vorming van 
wetgewende maatreëls wanneer dit uitgevaardig word deur die wetgewer. Erkenning van die waarde 
van openbare deelname gee uitvoering aan die kultuur van aanspreeklikheid, ’n ingesteldheid 
van verantwoordbaarheid en deursigtigheid wat deel vorm van die onderliggende waardes van ons 
grondwetlike demokratiese stelsel. 
Lede van die uitvoerende gesag ontleen hul wetgewende magte aan primêre wetgewing en in die 
besonder die grondwet. Sodanige magte manifesteer by wyse van ondergeskikte wetgewing in die vorm 
van reëls, kennisgewings, proklamasies en regulasies. In hierdie sin word na uitvoerende reëls verwys 
as wetgewende administratiewe optrede. 
90 Burns and Henrico (n 14) 325. 
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Geen uitdruklike voorsiening word in die grondwet gemaak om te verseker dat openbare deelname 
ten opsigte van wetgewende administratiewe optrede te alle tye moet plaasvind nie. Die omvang van 
openbare deelname hang af van die bepalings van die primêre wetgewing en die mate waartoe ’n 
lid van die uitvoerende gesag hom gebonde ag om die beginsel ook in ondergeskikte wetgewing te 
implementeer. In baie gevalle is die regulering wat verorden moet word dermate van openbare belang dat 
die verantwoordelike lid van die uitvoerende gesag openbare deelname sal verlang. Openbare deelname 
ten opsigte van wetgewende administratiewe optrede kan as beperk beskryf word. Terwyl oorwegings 
van noodsaaklikheid en praktiese doeltreffendheid die aanvaarding van ondergeskikte wetgewing mag 
regverdig selfs ondanks gebrekkige openbare deelname, behoef die gemeenskap beskerming teen die 
misbruik wat die uitoefening van openbare bevoegdhede mag inhou. Die uitoefening van sodanige 
bevoegdhede behoort deurgaans onderhewig te wees aan toetsing teen die grondwet en die beginsel 
van legitimiteit. Artikel 4 van die Wet op Bevordering van Administratiewe Geregtigheid maak in die 
besonder voorsiening vir openbare deelname in alle gevalle waar administratiewe optrede regte van die 
publiek potensieel wesenlik kan raak en die publiek kan benadeel. 
BRONNE VAN VORDERINGSREGTE – LUIDENS DIE DIGESTA – SED, EX AFRICA SEMPER 
ALIQUID NOVI
D 44 7 1pr: “Obligationes aut ex contractu nascuntur aut ex maleficio aut proprio quodam iure ex variis 
causarum figuris – verbintenisse ontstaan uit kontrak, delik of op grond van een of ander besondere 
regsreël uit verskillende ander oorsake” – dus indien geen geldige kontrak erken word nie, kan daar 
geen sprake van ’n vorderingsreg gebaseer op ’n kontrak wees nie, maar:
“Implicitly, therefore, the learned judge had accepted that the respondent could enforce its contractual 
claim even though the contract was invalid” per Cachalia JA in Umgungundlovu District Municipality 
v Amaraka Investments 37 (Pty) Ltd (case no 921/19) 2020 ZASCA 52 (15 May 2020) par 13 – eie 
kursivering. Die hoogste hof van appèl het die appèl teen dáárdie merkwaardige bevinding van die hof 
a quo waarkragtens die eis as kontraktuele eis as afdwingbaar gehandhaaf is nieteenstaande die juiste 
bevinding dat die kontrak ongeldig is, egter eenparig met koste verwerp en dus daardie merkwaardige 
bevinding klakkeloos gehandhaaf. “The judicial institutions currently have a shortage of skills” per 
Cachalia JA “Denuding the bench of skills – the Judicial Service Commission and the selection of 
judges” 2020: April Advocate 26. Roma locuta est, causa finita est.
        
